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This research focuses on the cyber-attack of the smart grid and its retrieval to a normal
state by estimating the smart grid's resilience. This study developed a theoretical model to
estimate the resilience of the smart grid using choice modeling. A utility function is formulated
based on various factors and subfactors of resilience to estimate the resilience of the smart grid.
Choice modeling is applied to estimate the model parameters in various fields such as marketing,
energy, transportation, and health and to predict the outcome.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The smart grid supplies electricity to stations in the centralized era and transmits them
to customers through transmission and transmission systems. The network is operated, controlled,
and monitored using information and communications technology (ICT). These innovations allow
energetic companies to continuously monitor their control requirements and gain the capacity and
reliability of control shipments at a lower cost. The smart grid framework provides
the most qualified electricity organization operations based on the information obtained by
consumers through improved two-way communication between buyers and electricity control
companies. Security is a top vital concern of smart grid systems because of the risks and burdens
those residents and businesses might encounter of an attack on the power grid. Three fundamental
security goals must be joined within the smart grid framework:
1) the ability to provide uninterruptible power on demand of the user;
2) the integrity of the information communicated;
3) the confidentiality of the information Confidential data on the user's network (Aloul et al.,
2012).

Within the smart grid environment, the characteristics of control systems can be summarized as
extendible, open, and available. Since these characteristics make such systems more helpless, in
any case, it is critical to get the nature of cyber dangers in arrange to guarantee that they are secure
1

(김발호.,2016). A cyberattack is the loss or destruction of a targeted executive by modifying or
redirecting stored information using various attack procedures on the Internet. In ICT, cyber risks
are basically classified into system, network, and web level risks. As a prerequisite for a cyberattack,

specific

data on

the target frame

must be collected

during the

so-

called information retrieval phase. System-level, network-level, Web-level, and information
seeking stage (김발호,2016). The Smart Grid addresses a phenomenal chance to move the energy
business into another time of unwavering quality, accessibility, and effectiveness that will add to
our financial and natural wellbeing (U.S department of energy, Smart grid).

Figure 1

NIST Smart Grid Conceptual Model-Interaction of roles in different smart grid
domains through secure communication (FitzPatrick,2011).

Resilience of the smart grid
Resilience is the potential of a system to quickly and efficiently recover from an adverse
condition impacting the system's performance to decrease and resume regular operation. Extreme
catastrophes such as hurricanes, tornadoes, and floods, as well as large-scale coordinated cyber2

attacks and ways to recover from these occurrences, are often addressed while examining grid
resilience. Designing microgrids that can run independently of each other and thus provide a way
for quick recovery from an extreme occurrence outage is a frequent strategy used to improve
smart grids' resilience (Das et al,2020). The ability of a system to tolerate interruptions while
maintaining its form and composition is also known as resilience (Fiksel,2003).

Choice Modeling helps in the analysis of questions such as "What, why, and how the behavior of
the factors affects the circumstance or encountered problem," as well as providing a consequence
with predicted outputs using various modeling methodologies across numerous disciplines across
time. We can identify major factors or variables in consumption or repetitive behavior by studying
the outcomes. In sectors such as marketing, transportation, energy, and health, choice modeling
is used to estimate model parameters (S Hess et al,2020). For example, Individuals make numerous
decisions in transportation, such as whether to travel or not, which method of travel to use, and
which route or transit line to use. All of these judgments entail picking one option from a list of
several: a discrete choice (Molly et al,2019).

In business, resilience is defined as an organization's, resource's, or structure's ability to withstand
the effects of a system failure, retrieve, and restart operations in order to continue to deliver
essential services (Hoffman,2007). This definition of choice modeling has implanted the idea and
strength to the idea of implementing choice modeling to the smart grid. As withstanding of an
attack is the primary function of smart grid in terms security with increase of cyber-attacks.
Till today, many different techniques have been implemented to calculate the resilience of the
smart grid. This is the first research to propose a choice modeling technique (estimation) to
3

increase the resilience of smart grid by calculating the resilience as the ratio of recoverability to
vulnerability (Ibne Hossian et al,2020). In this research a conceptual framework is designed to
estimate the resilience with effect of various factors during attack using multi-nominal logit and
Nested logit and hessian matrix to calculate the probabilities of the likelihood function.
Section 2 of this research talks about the literature review of the resilience capacity, section 3
defines choice modeling, section 4 describes the methodology of the framework and section 5
concludes with summary and limitations of the research.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Vulnerability and restoration are parent nodes of resilience (Ibne Hossian et al,2020). According
to Ibne Hossain et al(2020), resilience is calculated as a ratio of recoverability(restoration) to
vulnerability. Equation 1 below represents the resilience calculation:

𝑹𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 =

𝑹𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚(𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏)
𝑽𝒖𝒍𝒏𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚

(1)

The mechanisms for recovering a geographic area/organization from any impact or exterior
disturbances due to interruption are known as resilience capacities. The absorptive capacity,
adaptive capacity, and restorative capacity of the system can be used to describe smart grid
restoration (recoverability). The three components of the software, access, and network are now
used to solve smart grid vulnerability (Ibne Hossian et al,2020). The parameters of the proposed
technique are specified in this research from the aspect of cyber resilience. In order to effectively
analyze the cyber resilience of the smart grid system, it is vital to first identify the most important
parameters. The following approach is used to determine most of the relevant factors associated
with vulnerability and recoverability. Within the framework of the smart grid system, a
comprehensive study has been made, examined, and expert opinions were incorporated. The
sources of vulnerability, as well as several methods for restoring the smart grid from hackers, are
explored in the sub-sections below.
5

Restoration(recoverability)
Restoration (recoverability) can be represented using a specific type of resilience capacities,
comprising absorptive, adaptive, and restorative capacity (Biringer et al, 2013). A system's
resilience capacity is an internal characteristic that enhances the ability to absorb, adapt, and
recover from any foreign attacks or interruptions (Hossian et al,2019). The following is an
overview of various resilience capacities.
Absorptive Capacity
Absorptive capacity is an internal aspect of the syst(em that is mostly regarded to be the first line
of protection against the disruption's consequences Biringer et al,2013; Hossian et al,2019). The
system's absorptive capacity refers to a series of explicit proactive actions through which a system
will automatically cope with the shock's vulnerability or sensitivity with little effort. Advanced
metering infrastructure (AMI) and Visualization technology are the two important factors of
absorptive capacity of the smart grid resilience (Ibne Hossian et al,2020).
Advanced metering infrastructure (AMI)
AMI enables providers a two-way communications network with meters and also the opportunity
to modify service-level parameters for users (Farhangi,2009). AMI, also referred to as "smart
metering," is a key element of the smart grid system, which includes smart meters, concentrators,
and the Meter Data Management System, which together enables effective encrypted connection,
energy consumption measurements, connectivity with outside nodes, data storage, and
management, among several other things (Mohammadali et al,2016). According to McLaughlin
et al., an attacker's method of tricking the energy grid by affecting AMI systems and conduct
security audits on commodity devices to confirm the effectiveness of these attacks. They led to the
6

realization that not only is theft viable in AMI systems, but that modern AMI devices present a
variety of new channels to do so (S. McLaughlin et al,2009). Varodayan and Gao (2010) suggested
a secure mechanism for distribution companies to reflect the energy readings they receive from
smart meters back to consumers so that users may check the smart meter's integrity. This would
restrict the attacker from manipulating the smart meter reading and guarantee the reading accuracy.
The integrated advanced metering management system was first implemented in 2004 to maximize
energy efficiency in Italy's capital. The system features high accuracy trans meters and smart grid
applications, including network operation control and the capability to monitor low and medium
voltage line status automatically (Fang et al,2011). The key elements of AMI are the HAN, smart
meter, operational gateway, and meter data management system. AMI collects, evaluates, stores,
and transmits measurement data from smart meters to authorized parties. As a result, they may use
the data to estimate demand, manage outages, and bill customers. It assists consumers in
maximizing energy efficiency by providing real-time electricity prices (Gunduz & Das,2020).
Figure 2 shows a conventional communications infrastructure topology for smart grid AMI based
on the literature (A. Hamlyn 2008; G.A.Taylor,2006).

Figure 2

A smart grid AMI communication network architecture
7

The multitude of meter reading messages to be validated may overload a smart grid system that
connects dozens of buildings, each with many units. Furthermore, smart grid AMI communications
are vulnerable to traditional cyber assaults like capacity depletion and disguise attacks due to
wireless and IP technology deployment. The requirements of AMI security are:
•

Authentication of device

•

Confidentiality of data

•

Message Integrity

•

Maintaining confidentiality of some parts

•

Avoiding potential cyber-attacks.

Digital signature and authenticating each message can improve communication security;
approaches based on traditional cryptographic operations are neither effective nor extensible in a
smart grid system due to traffic volume and resource limits. To perform meter reading data
collecting and management message dissemination securely and efficiently, we need minimal but
efficient and reliable techniques designed specifically for smart grid AMI communications (Yan
et al,2013).
Visualization Technology
Experts need to integrate cutting-edge technologies into the structure of smart grid technology to
outsmart the actions of cyber attackers (Venugopalan & Rai,2015). At the utility level, grid
visualization tools can be used for real-time load monitoring and load growth planning. When the
demand response program for users grows, it may be difficult to interpret and visualize data. The
VERDE platform, embedded in Google Earth, enables wide-area grid monitoring by combining
real-time sensor data, weather forecasts, and grid modeling with geographic data to allow the smart
8

grid system cyber protected. It also can provide real-time information regarding outages and power
quality to improve system reliability (Ibne Hossian et al,2020). In terms of power system operation,
forecast, fault detection, dispatch, and service, visualization provides an excellent interface to the
power system operator (Chen& Chen,2021). Low dimensional techniques, multivariate high
dimensional and Geographical information system (GIS) techniques are three main categories of
techniques used to visualize the smart grid data distribution.

According to M. Stefan et al., Time-critical (grid monitoring) and non-time-critical (grid history)
are two features of visualization. In grid monitoring, the system's real-time visualization
capabilities are heavily dependent on the frequency at which data is gathered and saved in the
database, as well as the occurrences during real-time data processing. To obtain the shortest
processing delays in this situation, one must determine what data must be analyzed by each
visualization aspect. For the tracking system, the latency in data processing is crucial. It must be
minimized while calculating the amount of data necessary to make competent conclusions, the
cost of data monitoring and generated events, and the time it takes to retrieve the important
information Ex: Voltage drop/rise. Non-time-critical characteristics are associated with electrical
grid planning, which is used to develop a model for future state estimations. As a result, what
parameters to measure, which data to pass onto the visualization system, and how to analyze the
data should be determined so the database visualization system can be optimized Ex: Power
Balancing (M Stefan et al,2017). Various attributes of nodes in the system can be visualized to
yield a better understanding of the nature of a cyberattack (Matuszak et al,2013). Table 1 represents
various tools used in visualization technology.
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Table 1

Various tools used in Visualization Technology

Author
Foreman et al (2015)

Tools
Immersive
tool

Summary/Goal
Visualization Provides users with a simulation
that can support both existing and
proposed power grid technologies
while engaging them in a realistic
visualization environment

Nga, D. V et al (2012)

Single line diagram, 2D Single line diagrams show how
chart and 3D surface with
substations are connected as well as
contour
other important parameters such
as line status and AMI energized
condition.

2D Chart: A bar chart is used to
depict dynamic data. The number
of data points is represented on the
x-axis, while the total energy
consumption of all substations is
represented

on

the

y-axis.

3D Chart: Grid operators utilize 3D displays to visualize power usage
or load in 1-hour intervals over the
course of the month.
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Table 1(continued)
Author

Tools

Summary/Goal

Chen, X et al (2021)

Virtual reality (VR) and Virtual reality (VR) is a significant
Augmented reality (AR)
technology for improving user
interaction with virtual scenes in
future data visualization.
Augmented

Reality

(AR)

technology is to overlaps virtual
information on physical objects to
create a new virtual reality world.
Nga, D. V et al (2012)

Parallel coordinate, scatter Instead of employing orthogonal
diagram and Andrew curve
axes as in a traditional Cartesian
graph, the coordinate axes in
parallel coordinates are all set down
horizontally. In the plot, each
observation is represented by a set
of connected line segments.
The scatter diagram shows all the
bivariate scatter plots between the
project's five variables, as well as a
uni-variate distribution for each
variable. The Scatter plot displays
only bi-variate relationships.
Each sample is represented as a
smooth function over the interval
[0, 1] in the Andrew curve plot.

11

Table 1 (continued)
Author

Tools

Matuszak et al (2013)

CyberSAVe
framework

Summary/Goal
visualization CyberSAVe enables

a system

operator to determine not just the
existence of hardware or software
failure but also the reason behind
the

failure

and,

possibly,

prevention methods.
Khan, M.I.U et al (2016)

Spatial Analysis

The

additional

and

new

information from the GIS data is
extracted

via

spatial

analysis.

Different geographic tools were
employed in GIS for feature
statistics, as well as a buffer,
intersect,

union,

geoprocessing

tools

and

other

in

spatial

analysis for smart grid systems.

Figure 3

Two factors of absorptive capacity considered to construct the utility function
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Adaptive Capacity
The potential of a system to self-organize and provide timely responses to deal with external
disturbances without any restorative activity is described as adaptive capacity, which is regarded
as the midline of defense (Ibne Hossian et al,2020). Enhancing the system's adaptive capacity,
either by ensuring that the system is designed with enough redundancy to continue to function or
by boosting the system's ability and pace to modify and adapt to change as they arise. ‘Strategy,
operations, management systems, governance structure, and decision-support capabilities’ to
tolerate interruptions and perturbations is defined as adaptive capacity (Dalziell&McManus,2004).
Grid partitioning and delay adaptive control strategy are the two important factors of adaptive
capacity (Ibne Hossian et al,2020).
Grid partitioning
Grid partitioning enables system operators to alter voltage regulation within each microgrid and
reduce signal security concerns and compounding errors in the vastly complicated network during
any disturbance, reducing the impact of cyber disruptions (Ibne Hossian et al,2020).
Delay adaptive control
A delay-adaptive control technique can be implemented to develop a resilient smart power grid,
reducing the network latency of the system to a delay-free process (Ibne Hossian et al,2020).
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Figure 4

Two factors of adaptive capacity considered to construct the utility function

Restorative capacity
By comparison to other recovery methods, cyber control recovery is projected to be faster. System
restoration may take longer than expected if the malicious virus infects the entire SG system of
systems. It will take a sophisticated team of professionals who can work on an advanced decision
support platform to ensure that every infected machine is rapidly restored to its original state. The
restorative capacity comprises of two main factors namely restoration of control and restoration of
self-healing in calculating the resilience of the smart grid (Ibne Hossian et al,2020).
Restoration of control
Smart grid control architecture is defined as restoring control for fault diagnosis and power
retrieval
Restoration of self-healing
A malfunction may occur within a power underlying system switch breaker, which can be fixed
using a restorative self-healing process like an artificial immune response as an optimization
technique (Ibne Hossian et al,2020).
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Figure 5

Two factors of restorative capacity considered to construct the utility function

Vulnerability
The performance of the smart grid is impacted by three domain vulnerabilities, namely access
domain, network domain, and software domain vulnerability. Each domain vulnerability is being
further impacted by more than one factors (Ibne Hossian et al,2020).

Figure 6

Three factors of vulnerability impacting the smart grid
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Access domain Vulnerability
Many common cyber vulnerabilities of the access control domain include the failure to remove
duties through allocated access privileges, the failure to restrict system administration for
unsuccessful attempts, and the inability to end remote access sessions after a predetermined
duration. Weak user and Unauthorized protocols compromise the security of the smart grid leading
to access domain vulnerability (Ibne Hossian et al,2020).
Network domain Vulnerability
The architectural development and execution techniques are linked to vulnerabilities in the
network domain. From the network domain, a correct proposed system can monitor a process and
regulate the delivery of computation for a business function. Network configuration and network
audit and monitor can be considered as to-priority in network domain vulnerability (Ibne Hossian
et al,2020).
Software domain vulnerability
There are several underlying factors causes software domain vulnerability. Weak code and
improper data validation are few important factors affecting the software domain (Ibne Hossian et
al,2020).

16

CHAPTER III
CHOICE MODELING
The main objective of Choice Modeling is to comprehend the behavioral hypothesis in order to
predict, enhance, and implement quantifiable ways to construct a model. To construct a model in
choice modeling, we identify the dependent variables first, then determine the relationship
between variables, predict the likelihood, and estimate the parameters using the data in the
database. Alternative specific constants are calculated using a mathematical equation known as the
Utility function for available variables. Choice Modeling has been implemented using a variety of
software in recent years such as Python Biogeme (Bierlaire,2018), apollo package in R etc (Hess
& Palma,2019).

The theory-driven models have dominated choice modeling filed. Choice models that are driven
by behavioral theories, such as Utility Theory (UT) (McFadden 2001), Regret Theory (RT)
(Loomes and Sugden 1982), and Prospect Theory (PT) (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky
and Kahneman 1992), are examples of theory-driven discrete choice models. Logit, probit, mixed
logit, and latent class models are commonly used to estimate complex models. The goal of choice
modeling researchers is to build models that generate interpretable, repeatable, scalable, versatile
(including the required complexity), and robust predictions and findings (in out-of-sample,
externally valid). Choice modeling concepts include random variable, probability distribution,

17

error term, confidence and prediction intervals, estimator consistency and asymptotic features,
central limit theorem, and latent variable (Van Cranenburgh et al,2021).

The actual data generation process – which in the case of choice modeling is the decision-making
process– is a stochastic process that may be discovered by evaluating alternative statistical models,
according to a choice modeler. Competing models for a choice modeler come from a variety of
decision theories, such as Utility Theory, Prospect Theory, Regret Theory, and functional forms,
such as different error term distributions. The analyst considers the optimal model to be the actual
representation of the data from which behavioral inferences can be drawn after recognizing it. That
is, the model's parameters are interpreted in terms of the meaning offered by behavioral theory
(assuming the model is valid). A logit kernel, a membership function, a mixing kernel, a random
number generator, and other well-known building blocks are commonly used in choice models.
These components are included in several popular software packages, including Biogeme, Pylogit,
and Apollo. (Van Cranenburgh et al,2021).

For decades, discrete choice modeling is used to model and predict choices as a mathematical tool.
Although complicated model structures were developed theoretically in the early phases, it wasn't
until recent increases in computing power that this technique became widely used and enabled
future advancements (Calastri,2020). Multinominal Logit (MNL) and Nested Logit (NL) are the
widely used discrete choice models techniques to estimate the parameters in various environments.
The theory of behavior predicts how an individual behaves but not how they should and the aptness
of the model to apply in various situations in real-time functioning. To construct a behavioral
model, we have to take into a picture of decision-maker choice; in general, a decision-maker can
18

be an individual or a group of persons or firm with a variety of tastes, behavior, and situations
having different socio-economic characteristics such as age, income, level of education,
employment to understand their choices from available alternatives by identifying the variables to
describe each alternative. Decision maker of the model, denoted by n. Need to list the choice set,
either a continuous or a discrete set, define and characterize the alternatives using different
variables. Decision-maker decision is represented in the form of a mathematical function known
as ‘utility function’ involving the alternatives of choice set with a value, we select the alternative
with the highest utility value to make decisions, and decision-maker is assumed to be optimizer
and finds an optimized solution. The optimal solution differs with the change of different
parameters. To find optimal quantity as a function of parameters, we use the demand function. In
specific scenarios, the utility function depends on both continuous goods quantity and discrete
choice function made. The Utility function is represented as Un and Choice set is represented by
Cn. In theoretical development, the behavior of an individual is assumed to be deterministic, with
assumed properties of the consistent preferences, which is not valid in real scenarios as preferences
are inconsistent. To understand the observations of inconsistent preferences, the probabilistic
choice theory is used. In probabilistic choice theory, the probability of different outcomes is
determined by a specific decision-maker and situation. In developing the model, there are two
assumptions made firstly, humans are deterministic and choose the highest utility alternative.
Second, the analyst is not sure of utility as he doesn’t have a clear view of the factors affecting
human behavior and treats it as a random variable. This is known as a random utility approach,
combining the approach or idea for building, and operating the model (Bierlaire,2003).
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Probabilistic model is expressed as
𝑝(ⅈ|𝐶𝑛 ) = 𝑝𝛾 (𝑈𝑖𝑛 ≥ 𝑈𝑗𝑛 , ∀𝜖𝐶𝑛 )

(1)

𝑈𝑖𝑛 = 𝑣𝑖𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑛

(2)

Where,

Uin → Utility; Vin → Deterministic part of utility observed by analyst; ℇin → Error term;
Multi-nominal Logit
Multinomial logit models have been used to explain how decision makers compare and assess
alternatives since the 1970’s (McFadden,1973). The IIA property of MNL states that the ratio of
the probabilities of selecting any two options is independent of the availability of the third
alternative (Yun&Sun,2012). One of the most appropriate techniques to study preferences for
mode choice is the random utility maximization (RUM) framework, which is a discrete choice
model. Individual n chooses choice i when the related utility is the highest when compared to the
other options, it is predicted (Ashkrof et al,2019).
The utility function of the multinomial logit consists of two parts namely deterministic and error
term (S Hess et al,2020).
𝑈𝑖𝑛 = 𝑣𝑖𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑛

(4)

Where, Uin → Utility; Vin → Deterministic part of utility observed by analyst; ℇin → Error term.
(Bai et al.,2017).
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In MNL model, the probability for alternative i in choice task t for person n is given by:

𝑃𝑛,𝑖,𝑡 (𝛽) =

𝑧𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙,𝑖,𝑛,𝑡 ∗ ⅇ 𝑣𝑖,𝑛,𝑡
𝑗̅

𝛴𝑗=1 𝑧𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙,𝑗,𝑛,𝑡 ∗ ⅇ 𝑣𝑗,𝑛,𝑡

.

(3)

Where β is a vector combining all the parameters and Vj,n,t refers to the deterministic part of utility
function and ⅇ 𝑣𝑗,𝑛,𝑡 refers to the error term. No limitations are being exposed on the flexibility.
The likelihood function of the model applied is
𝑇𝑛

𝐿𝑛 (𝛽) = ∏ 𝑃𝑗𝑛∗ ,𝑡

(6)

𝑡=1

Where Tn is the number of separate choices set situation
Nested Logit
The nested logit model is based on the notion that some choices can be combined into many groups
(called nests). In the same nest, the error terms may show some correlation, although error terms
from other nests are still uncorrelated (Yun&Sun,2012). Nested logit model segregates the utility
function by the nesting specifications at different levels within the nested probabilities. The root
of the nested parameter is normalized to 1 (S Hess et al,2020).
The probability of choosing alternative i in situation t by person n is given by:

𝑃𝑖,𝑛,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑚,𝑛,𝑡 𝑃(𝑜𝑚|𝑚),𝑛,𝑡 𝑃(𝑖|𝑜𝑚),𝑛,𝑡

(7)

Where,

𝑃(𝑖|𝑜𝑚),𝑛,𝑡 =

𝑣
( 𝑖,𝑛,𝑡 )
ⅇ 𝜆0𝑚

𝛴𝑗∈0 𝑚
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ⅇ(

𝑣𝑗,𝑛𝑡

1)

𝜆0 𝑚

(8)

𝑃(𝑜𝑚|𝑚),𝑛,𝑡 =

𝑃𝑚,𝑛,𝑡 =

Table 2

ⅇ

𝜆 𝑚
( 0 𝐼0 ,𝑛,𝑡)
𝜆𝑚

(9)

𝜆
( 𝑙 Im,𝑛,𝑡)
𝑀
𝜆𝑚
𝛴𝐿𝑚=1 ⅇ

ⅇ

𝜆𝑚
(
𝐼𝑚,𝑛,𝑡)
𝜆𝑟

(10)

𝜆
𝑀
𝛴𝑚=1
ⅇ ( 𝐿 𝐼𝑙 , 𝑛, 𝑡)
𝜆𝛾

Represents various applications of MNL and NL models

Author
Hagenauer et al (2017)
Alwosheel et al (2019)
Mohammadian & Miller (2002)
Newman et al (2020)
Yao et al (2020)

Application
Travel mode
Travel mode
Vehicle Type
Airline Itinerary
Route
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Model
MNL
MNL
NL
MNL, NL
MNL

CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY
The approach for the proposed methodology was developed after a thorough examination of the
literature. The search for available literature was guided by keyword phrases (i.e., smart grid,
resilience capacities, adapt, recover, vulnerability, etc.) referring to the factors and subfactors
impacting smart grid resilience in the Scopus and Web of Science databases. The database search
comprised peer-reviewed publications, websites, conferences, and book chapters in order to
understand all issues linked to the resilience of the smart grid and cyber-attacks on the smart grid,
as well as choice modeling techniques on diverse applications. To increase the resilience of the
smart grid, 12 attributes are chosen upon extensive literature review.

In this research, we have designed the conceptual model for estimating the resilience of the smart
grid using the apollo package in R (S Hess et al,2020). We have followed the following steps to
formulate the utility function for estimating resilience.

Step 1: Identified the factors affecting the resilience of the smart grid with an extensive literature
review. With the literature review, we observed Adaptive, Absorptive, and restorative capacity
plays a key role in calculating the resilience of the smart grid along with vulnerability factors.
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Step 2: Quantified factors and sub-factors affecting the resilience of the smart grid. MS Excel is
used to quantify the factors and sub-factors based on the Ibne et al., (2020) paper modeling
techniques, depict the result as following for restorative and vulnerability

Table 3

Represents quantified data representation of factors and sub-factors
Factors

Description
Absorptive Capacity

MS Excel

AMI

Cyber-attack prevented – True;
otherwise - False

1-True; 0- False

Visualization Technique

Failure prevented -True;
otherwise - False

1-True; 0- False

Grid Partitioning
Delay-adaptive control
strategy

Adaptive Capacity
Failure prevented -True;
otherwise - False
Varies between 80 and 120ms
with mean delay 100ms

1-True; 0- False
Mean ≈ 100ms

Restorative Capacity
Restoration of Control

Retrieved to the fullest – True;
Otherwise- False

1-True; 0- False

Restorative Self-Healing

Self-healed- True; Otherwise False

1-True; 0- False

Weak code
Improper data validation

Weak User
Unauthorized protocols

Software domain vulnerability
Weak code – True, Otherwise False
Improper validation- True,
Otherwise - False
Access domain vulnerability
Weak User- True, Otherwise False
Unauthorized protocol- True,
Otherwise - False
Network domain vulnerability
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1-True; 0- False
1-True; 0- False

1-True; 0- False
1-True; 0- False

Table 3 (continued)
Network Configuration

Safe configuration- True,
Otherwise - False

1-True; 0- False

Network audit and
monitoring

Weak Network- True,
Otherwise - False

1-True; 0- False

Step 3: Define the model parameters, definition, and Estimation.
In this model, we consider utility function U according to equation 4, for each factor, denoted by
i ∈ I in situation denoted by t ∈ T for each circumstance/ attack n ∈ N are given by
𝑈𝑖,𝑛,𝑡 = 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛽1∗ 𝑥1 + 𝛽2∗ 𝑥2 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑛,𝑡

(11)

Where, 𝛿𝑖 represents the alternative constant for each factor for both vulnerability and restorative
factors, 𝑥1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥2 denotes sub-factors of each factor. 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 denotes the combining vector of
each sub-factor. 𝜀𝑗,𝑛,𝑡 denotes the error term of the utility function. The utility function has two
terms deterministic and error term of each factor, deterministic term consists of sub-factors of each
factor. Equation 11, can be further simplified for recoverability and vulnerability as follows:
Utility functions to calculate the recoverability capacity of the smart grid are:
1. Utility function of absorptive capacity denoted by 𝑈𝑎𝑏,𝑛,𝑡 :

𝑈𝑎𝑏,𝑛,𝑡 = 𝛿𝑎𝑏 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑥𝑎𝑏1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑥𝑎𝑏2 + 𝜀𝑎𝑏,𝑛,𝑡

(12)

Where, 𝛿𝑎𝑏 is specific constant of absorptive capacity, 𝑥𝑎𝑏1 represent quantified value of AMI and
𝑥𝑎𝑏2 denotes Visualization technology Boolean value and 𝜀𝑎𝑏,𝑛,𝑡 is the error term of absorptive
capacity. 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 denotes the Combining vector of each sub-factor. Every utility function
comprises of two terms – deterministic and error term.
2. Utility function of adaptive capacity denoted by 𝑈𝑎𝑑,𝑛,𝑡 :
25

𝑈𝑎𝑑,𝑛,𝑡 = 𝛿𝑎𝑑 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑥𝑎𝑑1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑥𝑎𝑑2 + 𝜀𝑎𝑑,𝑛,𝑡

(13)

Where, 𝛿𝑎𝑑 is specific constant of absorptive capacity, 𝑥𝑎𝑑1 represent Grid partitioning
quantification value as represented in quantification table in step 2 and 𝑥𝑎𝑑2 denotes delayadaptive control strategy with values in range of 80-120ms and mean 100ms generated using MS
Excel and 𝜀𝑎𝑑,𝑛,𝑡 is the error term of adaptive capacity. 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 denotes the Combining vector
of each sub-factor. Every utility function comprises of two terms – deterministic and error term.
3.Utility function of restorative capacity denoted by 𝑈𝑟𝑠,𝑛,𝑡 :
𝑈𝑟𝑠,𝑛,𝑡 = 𝛿𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑥𝑟𝑠1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑥𝑟𝑠2 + 𝜀𝑟𝑠,𝑛,𝑡

(14)

Where, 𝛿𝑟𝑠 is specific constant of restorative capacity, 𝑥𝑟𝑠1 represent quantified value of retrieve
of control and 𝑥𝑟𝑠2 denotes restorative self- healing Boolean value and 𝜀𝑟𝑠,𝑛,𝑡 is the error term of
restorative capacity. 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 denotes the weights of each sub-factor. Every utility function
comprises of two terms – deterministic and error term.
Utility functions to calculate the vulnerability of smart grid are:
1. Utility function of software domain vulnerability 𝑈𝑠𝑑,𝑛,𝑡 :

𝑈𝑠𝑑,𝑛,𝑡 = 𝛿𝑠𝑑 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑥𝑠𝑑1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑥𝑠𝑑2 + 𝜀𝑠𝑑,𝑛,𝑡

(15)

Utility function comprises of deterministic and error term of the utility function, where 𝛿𝑠𝑑
represent specific constant of software domain vulnerability and 𝑥𝑠𝑑1 represent weak code
quantification value as represented in quantification table in step 2 and 𝑥𝑠𝑑2 denotes improper data
validation Boolean value generated using MS Excel and 𝜀𝑠𝑑,𝑛,𝑡 is the error term. 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 denotes
the Combining vector of each sub-factor.
2. Utility function of access domain vulnerability 𝑈𝑎𝑣,𝑛,𝑡 :
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𝑈𝑎𝑣,𝑛,𝑡 = 𝛿𝑎𝑣 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑥𝑎𝑣1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑥𝑎𝑣2 + 𝜀𝑎𝑣,𝑛,𝑡

(16)

Where, 𝛿𝑎𝑣 is specific constant of access domain vulnerability, 𝑥𝑎𝑣1 represent quantified value of
weak user and 𝑥𝑎𝑣2 denotes unauthorized protocol Boolean value and 𝜀𝑎𝑣,𝑛,𝑡 is the error term of
access domain vulnerability. 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 denotes the Combining vector of each sub-factor. Every
utility function comprises of two terms – deterministic and error term.
3. Utility function of network domain vulnerability:
𝑈𝑛𝑑,𝑛,𝑡 = 𝛿𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑥𝑛𝑑1 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑥𝑛𝑑2 + 𝜀𝑛𝑑,𝑛,𝑡

(17)

Utility function comprises of deterministic and error term of the utility function, where 𝛿𝑛𝑑
represent specific constant of software domain vulnerability and 𝑥𝑛𝑑1 represent safe configuration
quantification value as represented in quantification table in step 2 and 𝑥𝑛𝑑2 denotes weak network
Boolean value generated using MS Excel and 𝜀𝑛𝑑,𝑛,𝑡 is the error term. 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 denotes the
Combining vector of each sub-factor.
Table 4

Represents the parameters of proposed utility function
Parameters
𝑈𝑎𝑏,𝑛,𝑡
𝛿𝑎𝑏
𝑥𝑎𝑏1
𝑥𝑎𝑏2
𝜀𝑎𝑏,𝑛,𝑡
𝑈𝑎𝑑,𝑛,𝑡
𝛿𝑎𝑑
𝑥𝑎𝑑1
𝑥𝑎𝑑2
𝜀𝑎𝑑,𝑛,𝑡
𝑈𝑟𝑠,𝑛,𝑡
𝛿𝑟𝑠
𝑥𝑟𝑠1
𝑥𝑟𝑠2
𝜀𝑟𝑠,𝑛,𝑡

Description
Utility function of absorptive capacity at a circumstance n and time t.
Specific constant of absorptive capacity
AMI quantification value
Visualization Boolean value
Error term of absorptive capacity
Utility function of adaptive capacity at a circumstance n and time t.
Specific constant of adaptive capacity
Grid Partitioning
Delay- adaptive control
Error term of absorptive capacity
Utility function of restorative capacity at a circumstance n and time t.
Specific constant of restorative capacity
Restorative of control value
Restorative self-healing value
Error term of restorative capacity
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Table 4(Continued)
𝑈𝑠𝑑,𝑛,𝑡
𝛿𝑠𝑑
𝑥𝑠𝑑1
𝑥𝑠𝑑2
𝜀𝑠𝑑,𝑛,𝑡
𝑈𝑎𝑣,𝑛,𝑡
𝛿𝑎𝑣
𝑥𝑎𝑣1
𝑥𝑎𝑣2
𝜀𝑎𝑣,𝑛,𝑡
𝑈𝑛𝑑,𝑛,𝑡
𝛿𝑛𝑑
𝑥𝑛𝑑1
𝑥𝑛𝑑2
𝜀𝑛𝑑,𝑛,𝑡
𝛽1 and 𝛽2

Utility function of software domain vulnerability at a circumstance n
and time t.
Specific constant of absorptive capacity
Weak code
Improper data validation
Error term of absorptive capacity
Utility function of access domain vulnerability at a circumstance n and
time t.
Specific constant of access domain vulnerability
Weak user
Unauthorized protocol
Error term of access domain vulnerability
Utility function of network domain vulnerability at a circumstance n and
time t.
Specific constant of network domain vulnerability
Network configuration – safe or unsafe
Weak network – Audit and Monitoring of network
Error term of network domain vulnerability
Combining vector of sub-factors

We can consider utility function with two possible cases with user initializing initial value of
parameters:
Case 1: Can fix the values of certain parameters over course of time allowing no changes to initial
value stored in it.
Case 2: Value of parameter can keep changing in the course of implementation with initialization
of the parameter with start value.
Initial values of defined parameters input can also include the outputs of any other or previous
model for model that is complex or hybrid.
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Multi nominal Logit model
In above utility functions

𝜀𝑎𝑏,𝑛,𝑡 , 𝜀𝑎𝑑,𝑛,𝑡 , 𝜀𝑟𝑠,𝑛,𝑡 ,

𝜀𝑠𝑑,𝑛,𝑡 ,

𝜀𝑎𝑣,𝑛,𝑡 ,

𝜀𝑛𝑑,𝑛,𝑡 denotes error

term distributed identical and independent values over different factors effecting the resilience
value with type I extreme distribution value.
MNL model is obtained with the probability for each factor i at the given time t under circumstance
n given by
𝑃𝑛,𝑖,𝑡 (𝛽) =

Vj,n,t

𝑧𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙,𝑖,𝑛,𝑡 ∗ ⅇ 𝑣𝑖,𝑛,𝑡

(18)
𝑗̅
𝛴𝑗=1 𝑧𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙,𝑗,𝑛,𝑡 ∗ ⅇ 𝑣𝑗,𝑛,𝑡
denotes the deterministic part of utility function without the error value of equation 11

excluding the error term 𝜀𝑗,𝑛,𝑡 and 𝑧𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙,𝑗,𝑛,𝑡 takes value 1 if alternative is available at time t during
attack n else takes value 0. Equation 18 calculates the probabilities of MNL model for each factor
individually. Each of the probability value of factors calculated is multiplied with the individual
attack probability for the same instance, hence recognizing the recurrent attack nature in our data
set. The probability is calculated when there we have multiple scenarios for each attack.
Estimation
∗
Model estimation comprises of calculating the probability of each or alternative factor of, 𝑗𝑛,𝑡
∗
during time t of attack n i.e 𝑃𝑗𝑛,𝑡
using equation18. The likelihood function of attack n with vector

component β of the model is calculated by
𝑇𝑛

𝐿𝑛 (𝛽) = ∏ 𝑃𝑗𝑛∗ ,𝑡

(19)

𝑡=1

𝑇𝑛 denotes number of attacks happened in different situations. For few data sets to calculate the
resilience we include weights during the estimation of model in our calculation. Next phase and
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last phase of the model is estimation after defining the model and parameters. The model is
estimated using the utility function, calculated probability value considering the two possible cases
of the values of each parameter.

For model estimation we use Hessian matrix, relying on numeric gradient. Hessian matrix is the
partial derivative of function f and n variable (Braun,2017).
𝑓: 𝑠 𝑛 → 𝑠
(20)
Hessian matrix

2
𝑆11
𝐻 𝑓(𝑥) = :
2
𝑆𝑛1

2
𝑆12
:
2
𝑆𝑛2

2
𝑆1𝑛
:
2
𝑆𝑛𝑛

(21)

The model estimation of recoverability and vulnerability follows the same steps right from
defining the parameters and model to calculating probability using Multi nominal logit and
likelihood function and the end individual result of both are feed into MS excel to calculate the
resilience of the smart grid using choice equation 1 of this research.
Nested Logit model
The nested logit model is applied to the dataset when utilities are further divided by parameters
within the probability range. To calculate the resilience of the smart grid, we can use the Nested
logit model along with the Multi nominal logit model for complex datasets with sub-factors being
grouped into different levels, namely m to be top-level and q to be the lower level of the sub-
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factors division. In nested logit model 𝜆 is used in calculating the probability of the model, unlike
multi nominal logit at a given time t during attack n and factor i.

The same utility function of the MNL model can be used, the estimation of the model use the
following probability values as equation 7

𝑃𝑖,𝑛,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑚,𝑛,𝑡 𝑃(𝑜𝑚|𝑚),𝑛,𝑡 𝑃(𝑖|𝑜𝑚),𝑛,𝑡

(22)

The 𝜆 values range between 0 and 1. This value can be changed depending upon the attack
frequency and loss to the smart grid.
0 < 𝜆𝑞 ≤ 𝜆𝑚 ≤ 𝜆𝛾 ≤ 1

(23)

We are normalizing the nested parameter to 1.
In a nested logit model, we design the tree structure with parameters of the utility function by
grouping and sub-grouping.

This framework can be coded and implemented using various software with minor changes to the
utility function or calculation of probability. In recent times the implementation of choice
modeling has peaked in Python, R and certain packages have been written specifically to choice
modeling.
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CHAPTER V
LIMITATION AND CONCLUSION
This research strengthens the resilience of the smart grid with the proposed technique for better
functionality of the smart grid after or before an attack. The goal of the proposed framework is to
understand the possibility of the attack and its countermeasure using a choice modeling framework
with multi-nominal and nominal logit. The limitation of this research is the mathematical model
framework is not implemented in real-time; it’s a conceptual model.

The mathematical model maximizes the restoration of the smart grid from a cyber-attack using
this framework by predicting the output resulting in the necessity action/implementation to be
made for future research or use.

Future research is required to convert the conceptual framework to the working model of the smart
grid to enhance resilience. Future research will be done towards the working model.
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